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ABOUT THE ROLE OF OSTENSIVE 
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OF STORYTELLING
I. Introduction
Our aim is to shed light on how ostensive cues function as useful tools 
for exploring the world and sharing the information gathered during these 
attempts by individuals at the same time. We approach this question within a 
theoretical framework which considers the use of symbols and language to 
be a species-specific mode of cultural transmission (Sperber 1996).1
Ostensive signals are responsible for making manifest an intention or a 
set of information to another individual different from the one they are per­
formed by. To make something (an intention or information) manifest is a 
type of human behaviour, called ostensive behaviour or ostensión. The need 
for paying attention to realize and comprehend the intended information of 
ostensive behaviour facilitates the use of ostensive signals. These signals have 
to be relevant enough to perceive from several physical stimuli around the 
(communicative) partners and to be relevant enough to change the interlocu­
tor’s cognitive environment. (Sperber/Wilson 1996: 46-50) These stimuli are 
intentionally motivated by a rational human agent. Because of this mutually 
existing expectations of the partners these stimuli seem to be non-accidental 
physical entities, rather they are motivated by an intentional rational human 
agent to make manifest or mutually manifest a set of information.
This paper has three main parts. At the beginning I would like to share an 
overview of the theoretical framework of our work. The second part focuses
1 This paper focusing on human children’s innate capacity to recognize and produce the pragmatic 
patterns of storytelling was prepared in collaboration by the members of the Developmental 
and Neuropragmatic Research Group of the University of Szeged, Hungary. The first version of 
this paper was delivered under the title »Now I’ll be the storyteller« - Children’s innate capacity 
to recognize and produce the pragmatic patterns of storytelling at the 13th International Prag­
matics Conference (Narrative Pragmatics: Culture, cognition, context) in New Delhi in 2013. 
The current paper is a further elaboration of the research topic with a pilot study of vigilance 
for ostensive cues of storytelling, http://ipra.ua.ac.be/main.aspx?c=. CONFERENCES &n= 
1447 
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on the specificity of a communicative situation and ostensive communicative 
signals of storytelling. I will introduce and specify our pilot study on the role 
of ostensive communicative context of storytelling in the third part of the 
paper.
»Cognitive efficiency consists in improving one’s knowledge of the world 
as much as possible given the available resources.« (Sperber/Wilson 1996: 47) 
Our hypothesis is that ostensive signals of communicative storytelling are 
the guarantee not to waste the mental processing effort humans need to get 
cognitive effect of relevant information of a story. We also would like to 
emphasize the importance of our abilities to make us to be sensitive to those 
stimuli which can be holders of causal relations of information of stories or 
narratives.
II. Theoretical framework
IL 1 The role of attention and joint attention in the interpretation of 
narratives
Based on the theory of Michael Tomasello, we could argue that the telling 
and understanding of stories (and narratives) are facilitated by our human­
specific abilities such as high level of identification with conspecifics, human 
intentionality, shared intentionality, humans’ intentional stance, cooperative 
motives, and a new type of learning (Tomasello 1999, 2008). These socio­
cognitive abilities and motivations already existed in pre-linguistic gestural 
communication. We can see a similar proposition in Donald’s model (see 
Donald 1991). According to Tomasello (2008), the species-specific character­
istics of human communication are based on the act of collaborative problem­
solving and the way humans engage with others collaboratively. The cogni­
tive basis of these abilities is the ability to identify with others as well as the 
human capacity to attribute intentions and mental states to others, i. e. we 
treat others as intentional agents. This makes it possible to read their minds. 
It can lead to the ability to solve problems together. The communicative use 
of language is based on the assumption that signals are produced intentionally 
and on the existence of humans’ intentional stance; humans generally rely 
on these assumptions when interpreting the actions of conspecifics. Shared 
intentionality is seen as a cornerstone in the evolution of human signalling, 
compared to individual intentionality. Children are able to take part in this 
cognitive collectivity from about nine months of age when they start making 
attempts to share attention with others (Tomasello 1999:15).
Tomasello identifies only one key adaptation throughout human evolution 
being responsible for the emergence of symbolic language. He puts great
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emphasis on a novel type of learning which paves the way for collaborative 
learning. The members of a group produce something together which would 
never be created by any of them on his own. Moreover, he does not see 
vocalization as the basis of the evolution of human communication but draws 
attention to the fact that the use of gestures might have been what human 
language evolved from. Those gestures that emerge a lot earlier than language 
in infants (see Tomasello 2008, Donald 1991). The emergence of conventional 
communication occurs after the emergence of shared intentionality and the 
ability to use gestures in a cooperative way, which is facilitated by a new type 
of cultural transmission. Therefore, it is not the creativity component which 
is considered to be new in the use of language (symbols) by humans; it is 
stabilization which is required for newly and cooperatively invented symbols 
to become conventional ones.
II.2 Pedagogical stance
Gergely and Csibra (2005) claim that the selective and interpretive nature of 
imitation specialized for cultural transmission and its role in pedagogy must 
be human-specific. Cultural transmissions normally happen in pedagogical 
contexts, and infants have a set of special cognitive mechanisms/resources 
by means of which they recognize and identify these events. Infants’ »ped­
agogical stance« (»intentional stance«) ensures that they learn the new and 
relevant cultural information. Ostensive and referential cues I stimuli draw 
their attention to the fact that they are being taught. According to Gergely 
and Csibra, in a communicative context (pedagogical demonstration context) 
early imitative learning is much faster and more successful.
Pedagogical communication is defined by Gergely and Csibra as follows:
... the selective interpretive nature of early imitative learning can be explained 
as a result of the implicit assumptions built into the infant’s »pedagogical 
stance« that constrain and guide imitative learning, and that is activated by 
the ostensive-communicative cues of knowledgeable others who manifest 
new and relevant cultural information for the infant to learn (Gergely/Csibra 
2005: 1347)
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III. Brief overview of skills and abilities underlying the 
interpretation of stories, narratives, and actions (Some 
results of developmental studies on the development of 
human communication)
III.l Human-specific abilities underlying the understanding of others
The philosopher Daniel Dennett (1987) gives an account of the intentional 
stance or strategy that humans rely on while interpreting the actions of other 
human agents or any living organisms, and even the workings of inanimate 
objects. This general capacity helps us understand, generalize, and predict 
what the agent intends to do or how the agent attempts to reach its goals. 
In order to be capable of predicting behaviour, it is also important for us to 
treat the object as a rational agent. This powerful tool never ceases to work 
in humans, and attributing mental states, beliefs, desires etc. to others might 
have been a huge evolutionary advantage for humankind as we are able to 
consider the goals of other rational agents in the light of their beliefs.
Gergely and Watson (1996) underlie the importance of parental bio-feed- 
back in early socio-emotional development. Mothers mirror their babies’ 
affective facial behaviour to mark them in order to differentiate between 
theirs own real feeling and these mirrored ones. Mothers give contingent 
responses to enable their children to interpret social interactions. That is the 
how Gergely and Watson imagine children learning to differentiate between 
certain feelings.
They claim (Gergely/Watson 1996: 1181-1212) that as result of parental 
social bio-feedback:
1. The infant will come to detect and group together the sets of internal state 
cues that are indicative of his or her categorically distinct dispositional 
emotion states.
2. The infant will establish secondary representations associated with his or 
her primary level procedural affect states providing the cognitive means 
for accessing and attributing emotion states to the self.
3. The infant will acquire a generalized communicative code of >marked< 
expressions characterized by the representational functions of referential 
decoupling, anchoring, and suspension of realistic consequences.
We will discuss the role of other cognitive abilities that are essential to under­
stand complex communicative situations in detail in the subsection focusing 
on neuropsychological factors.
Are infants able to interpret and draw inferences about the goals of others? 
Normally developing children over the age of 4 (Baron-Cohen/Leslie/ 
Frith 1985; Baron-Cohen 1995; Baron-Cohen 2000) are considered to have 
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the »mentalistic or intentional stance« described by Dennett (1987). However, 
the interpretation of goal-directed actions seems to emerge earlier, between 
the age of 7 and 12 months. This early competence of children has been tested 
by means of several paradigms, including imitation, joint attention or viola- 
tion-of-expectation looking time studies. Results of the latter type of tests 
show that children are surprised if the most efficient way of carrying out an 
action is avoided by the agent, which means that they have strong expec­
tations concerning the process and the most efficient (rational) alternative 
of carrying out goal-directed actions. They always suppose that agents act 
reasonably (Gergely/Csibra 2003; 2005, Csibra/Gergely 2011).
Gergely and Csibra (2003) have demonstrated in their experiments with 
infants that even one-year-olds are able to interpret and draw inferences 
about other people’s goal-directed actions. Infants rely on a non-mentalistic 
interpretational system, which later develops into a representational system 
controlling the inferences of adults about the mental states (beliefs, desires, 
intentions) of others. Children are led by the principle of rational action; they 
focus on goal-states and pick out the most efficient way available. Gergely 
and Csibra (2003, 2005) argue that children’s teleological stance creates an 
explanatory relation between the action, the goal state and the situational 
constraints. This »rationality principle« is considered by many to be a key 
component of the ability to read others’ mind.
III.2 The role of cultural learning in human ontogeny
Early cognitive competencies and other human-specific abilities of infants 
seem to form the basis of receiving useful and relevant knowledge from oth­
ers, mainly from older and knowledgeable conspecifics. Csibra (2010) argue 
that young children are sensitive to several ostensive stimuli (human face, 
eye-contact, child-directed speech (motherese), and contingent reactivity) 
and they also tend to imitate the actions of others. These capabilities are 
traditionally explained by several researchers. However, Csibra and Gergely 
(2011) assume that these abilities of babies should rather be interpreted as 
reflecting certain adaptations required to gain knowledge from others in 
pedagogical situations, where both teachers and students rely on the assump­
tion of relevance (Sperber/Wilson 1996) in order to find novel information. 
Furthermore, they claim that »natural pedagogy«, as they call it, (Csibra/ 
Gergely 2011) is likely to be human-specific (Gergely/Csibra 2003; 2005, 
Csibra/Gergely 2011), while Tomasello (1999, 2009) and his colleagues claim 
that it is mainly the so-called »shared intentionality« which differentiates 
humankind from other living organisms. The underlying skills in human 
children required to participate in activities that involve joint attention or 
intentions develop gradually during the first 14 months of their lives.
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By means of these developmental features children are able to learn from 
their older conspecifics. They acquire language, other different symbols, 
social norms etc. This learning is based on children’s a) abilities to understand 
others as intentional agents, and b) their early collaborative activities, i. e. 
their human-specific attempts to share feelings, activities or experience with 
others. Contingent reactivity of these natural pedagogical situations helps 
them to differentiate between the forms and related meanings or functions of 
behaviour via operant conditioning.
The following table summarizes how we can imagine the development 
of cultural thinking and learning on the basis of the works of the above 
mentioned authors.
Birth
6 months
9 months
Sensitivity to ostensive stimuli 
(human face, eye-contact, 
motherese, contigent 
reactivity) via operant 
conditioning
Understanding others acting 
animately + sensitivity to 
ostensive stimuli (human face, 
eye-contact, motherese, 
contigent reactivity) via 
operant conditioning
Understanding others 
pursuing goals; can 
differentiate between 
intentional and accidental 
actions
Interactions of human infants 
with others:
Dyadic engagement = sharing 
behaviour and emotions
»parental social biofeedback«
Triadic engagement = sharing 
goals and perception
New form of cognitive representation - dialogic cognitive representation
10 months Understanding when others 
choose plans
Understanding intentions
Collaborative activities, 
engagement with others = 
joint intentions and attention
12 months Understanding intentions From 1 to 2 years: 
creation and use of linguistic 
symbols; social norms; social 
institutions
4 years Understanding beliefs, mental 
states of others
Social norms, social 
institutions
Table 1: Ontogenesis of capacities and competencies in typically-developing 
human children (Tomasello 1999; 2009; Gergely/Csibra 2003; 2005, Csibra/ 
Gergely 2011; Gergely/Watson 1996; Ivasko/Lengyel/Komlosi 2014)
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III.3 Mentalization processes
Researchers focusing on the mentalization processes underlying the under­
standing of stories and narratives from neuropsychological and neurological 
points of view all emphasize the importance of our abilities to discover and 
understand causal relations, the consequences of others’ actions as well as 
the motives of intentional agents (see Happé/Frith 1996; Frith 2007). Fur­
thermore, most studies emphasize the human-specific nature of these mental 
processes (Tooby/Cosmides 1992; Cosmides/Tooby 2000; Frith/Frith 1999; 
Frith/Wolpert 2003; Frith 2007). These mentally processed causal relations 
could be relevant not only for the one itself, but they could be especially 
relevant for the community the one belongs to. What is more, researchers 
put special emphasis on studying individual stories, being important for con- 
specifics and the members of a group, and they also focus on understanding 
the cognitive processes individuals rely on while interpreting stories (László/ 
Rogers 2002; László 2005; Bruner 2001), stories of others.
Sharing information can be seen as an intentionally motivated human 
behaviour.
Universal forms of human behaviour such as the so-called ostensive be­
haviour (Sperber/Wilson 1995) enable humans to recognize and make their 
partners recognize mirrored emotional reactions, motoric reactions (Rizzo- 
latti/Fabbri-Destro 2008; Decety/Chaminade 2003; Bauer 2010) as well as 
different stimuli which are used to express various communicative intents. 
These ostensive stimuli are intentionally ordered. Moreover, they make it eas­
ier for communicative partners to decide whether the information provided 
by someone was produced intentionally or accidentally (Sperber et al. 2010), 
or whether it is relevant enough to be worth interpreting. Sequencing of these 
stimuli can be seen as causally related information to solve the problem of 
the intended content of the story.
According to Bauer (2010: 56), who investigates the development of in­
teractions in infants, children over the age of one year do not only mirror 
the emotions of others but they also rely on others’ actions and emotions in 
order to construct the picture of the world around them. The development 
of social identity commences in children after their first year of life, and it 
is triggered by emergence of their ability to differentiate between their self 
and others. After this phase, all the games children play pave the way for 
language development, and their games also make it possible for them to 
acquire the appropriate use of communicative symbols. The recognition of 
these symbols is facilitated by universal ostensive cues (Csibra 2010; Csibra/ 
Gergely 2011).
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IV. Telling an ordinary/everyday story or a folk tale
As we have seen studies in the field of developmental pragmatics focus on 
the abilities of children underlying the interpretation of stories for numerous 
reasons: On the one hand, these cases enable researchers to study the abilities 
underlying causal relationships triggered by the maturation in the frontal 
lobe. On the other hand, research is being conducted in order to discover 
how children interpret different literal and non-literal elements.
The following tables summarize why telling a tale in the form of social 
interactions is undoubtedly the same, or inherently differs from telling an 
ordinary, everyday story.
Table 2
Telling an 
ordinary/ 
everyday story
Telling a tale
Maturation in the frontal lobe / /
Causal relations ✓ ✓
Interpreting different literal and non­
literal elements
/ ✓
Degree of symbolicity
The emphasis is on the symbolic 
nature of the whole story instead of 
the figurative meaning of individual 
words.
low high
Children 
interpret tales 
according to their 
abilities and past 
experiences.
The telling of stories and tales is a typical example of ostensive communica­
tion during which children acquire the cultural knowledge shared by others. 
Children’s pedagogical stance (Gergely/Csibra 2003, 2005) and their sen­
sitivity to ostensive stimuli enable them to acquire this shared knowledge 
much faster and more efficiently. By means of this cognitive adaptation, the 
so-called natural pedagogy, infants expect to receive generalizable, culturally 
relevant knowledge (Csibra/Gergely 2009).
There are several ostensive signals that are typically present in verbal 
communicative situations when stories and tales are told to children. The 
study I present in this paper examines what kind of ostensive stimuli the 
tellers of tales/stories use in order to enable children to follow and un­
derstand their storytelling, a special way of verbal communication. More­
over, the study puts special emphasis on the way how the listeners (re-
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ceivers) of tales manage to acquire the embedded pragmatic signals not only 
in order to understand them, but also to make use of them adequately as 
creative language users (similarly to the way they use grammatical struc­
tures).
Ostensive stimuli
Recognizing informative 
intention
Telling an ordinary/ 
everyday story
Starting an utterance 
with:
a) »Imagine ...«
b) No special stimuli
According to Csibra 
(2010), children 
understand stimuli 
expressing special 
communicative 
intentions earlier than 
the information 
included in the narrative.
Telling a tale
Starting an utterance 
with:
»once upon a time« 
»a long, long time ago«
Children start using 
ostensive (eye-contact, 
intonation, posture etc.) 
stimuli earlier than their 
ability to provide 
information emerges.
Table 3
In the pragmatics of tales and the telling of tales, there are ostensive stimuli 
that are generally used to make it mutually understood that the speaker wants 
the listener to realize that she talks about a place and time different from those 
of the communicative situation, and that she gives account of events that are 
not connected to the reality of the communicative event (Boldizsár 2010). 
That is why elements occurring in tales such as »once upon a time« or »a long, 
long time ago« function as special verbal phrases drawing the joint attention 
of the partners to the aforementioned fact. Other similarly distinct physical 
features/signals are the rise in the storyteller’s pitch, his expressive and more 
intensive speech, the melody typical of storytelling and the modulation and 
elongation of vowels.
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Telling an ordinary/everyday Telling a tale 
story
The sequence 
of stories 
following 
ostensive 
starting 
utterances
Communi­
cative 
situation
a) Individual stories focusing 
on everyday events
b) Fictional narratives 
relying on concrete events 
and/or solving a problem
>Be aware, I’ll share some 
culturally relevant 
knowledge with you<
Depending on the degrees of relevance of the informative 
content of the story for the comunity or the individual there 
are different distinct physical features/signals: the rise in the 
storyteller’s pitch, his/her expressive and more intensive 
speech, the melody typical of storytelling and the modulation 
and elongation of vowels.
Talks about a place and time different from those of the 
communicative situation that are not connected to the reality 
of the communicative event (Boldizsár 2010).
low degree of symbolicity: 
»yesterday<, >in my gardens 
»last week<
high degree of symbolicity: 
>Far beyond the edge of the 
world there lived ... <
>In a place where no birds 
fly ... <
Table 4
In our pilot study for testing features of storytelling (Papp 2014; Papp/ 
Ivasko 2014), we used a so-called chain-type story. All causal relations were 
formed like »if, then« sentences.
Participants of this study were 13 typically developing three years old 
Hungarian children.
The hypothesis of the study was that the pragmatic pattern of telling tales 
to small children is similar to that of the universal features of infant-directed 
speech (motherese) (Clark/Clark 1977; Snow 1976, Snow/Ferguson 1977). 
A short story of a squirrel who lost it’s drum was told to children. It was a so 
called »chain« story, the squirrel had to ask help from others to find the drum.
'Variables:
- First group heard the story with the universal vocal features of motherese. 
(5 children)
- The second group heard the story with non-conventional stress on irrele­
vant expressions of the text. (3 children)
About the role of ostensive communicative context of storytelling 203
- The third group heard the story without any stress, it was quite mono­
tonous. The narrator had no eyecontact with the children. (2 children)
- The fourth group heard the story with universal vocal features of moth- 
erese, but there were some pseudo-words in the text. (3 children) For 
example >mutyika< instead of drum, >tákis< at the place of angry, >kóringyál< 
like feed someone.
Method:
Children had to listen to the stories watching a storyteller on a monitor of a 
computer. All types of the stories were videotaped, and children’s responses 
had been monitored by another camera. That is why we had a chance to 
follow their behaviour depending on the different variables.
Results and discussion:
After the children had heard the story they had to recall it. There were 
several other tests to measure how they understood and/or memorized the 
story. Those who heard the story with universal vocal features, but with 
some pseudo-words in the text, realized an acceptable, plausible meaning of 
pseudo-words with the persumption based on contextual elements. Those 
children who had heard the story with non-conventional stress on irrelevant 
expressions of the text and those who had heard the story without any stress 
lost their interest after 40-45 seconds and didn’t waste their processing effort 
to the expectedly minimal cognitive effort.
We found that
- Typically developing children loose their interest after 40 seconds if the 
narrative is told them with a monotonous voice,
- or if it is stressed incorrectly. It takes a great processing effort to find the 
relevance of the item (even if it has any).
- Communicative features of motherese could be useful for creating (and/ 
or inferring in a verbal context) new meanings in the case of interpreting 
pseudo-words.
Boldizsár (2010) argues that these features are essentially necessary for hu­
mans to pay very focused attention to the story. She says it is being the cause 
of a kind of »being in a trans«, humans are in when interpreting stories as 
relevant information. To put it with Sperber (1996), these ostensive signals 
are the guarantee for the relevance of a stimulus which is holding not only the 
information of the story but the expectation of its relevance to an individual. 
That is why culturally relevant information is told in oral literature in the 
same way for hundreds of years.
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While the pragmatic pattern of everyday storytelling characterizing chil­
dren is similar to that of adults following the emergence of children’s proto­
discourse in several instances (Tomasello 2008; Csibra 2010; Karmiloff/ 
Karmiloff-Smith 2002), the pragmatic pattern of telling tales adressing chil­
dren is similar to that of the universal features of infant-directed speech 
(motherese) (Clark/Clark 1977; Snow 1976, Snow/Ferguson 1977). The 
telling of tales and stories reflecting real-life events starts to differ signif­
icantly when children’s epistemic vigilance enables them to distinguish real 
and confabulated elements in their own and their partners’ stories. From 
this developmental stage children are able to make these differences man­
ifest. Social bio-feedback (Gergely/Watson 1996) based on contingent re­
activity balances this procedure by means of their communicative partner’s 
behavioural reactions marking (exaggerating), mirroring, and/or punishing, 
and/or rewarding them.
According to Ildikó Boldizsár (2010), we can agree with the conception 
that the main difference between the telling and interpreting of everyday 
stories and those of the so-called folk tales, which can considered to be the 
sources of cultural knowledge, is how their symbolic levels can be reached by 
children in different ages. In elder children, the emphasis is on the symbolic 
nature of the whole story instead of the figurative meaning of individual 
words.
What is it about these narratives that makes them so memorable?
In an oral tradition, all cultural representations are easily remembered ones, 
hard-to-remember representations are forgotten, or transformed into more 
easily remembered ones, before reaching a cultural level of distribution. (Sper- 
ber 1996: 74).
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